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meanwrightLast time, I tried to get Orlando to trade some wine casks for Roland's horse, assuming both were honest. And I found out that this was easy if they knew each other or knew of each other, but if they didn't know each other, it was hard. They were both too worried about the disastrous consequences if the trade went wrong. This was essentially a problem of asymmetric information, Roland's knowledge of the horse and Orlando's knowledge of his wine mean that each party could cheat the other. And so, without guarantees, a trade would not happen.
We usually look to government to make those guarantees for us. Licencing laws, small claims courts, etc., give Orlandos and Rolands some confidence that transactions are safe, or that they have reasonable redress if bilked. But, this is probably not how government grew.1
To look at this, let's see how people interact today when they don't have the full protection of the state. In America, at least, these people are prisoners. Technically, prisoners are guaranteed the rights everyone else has. Technically, prisoners have an immediate governmental authority to look after them. But, really, while incarcerated, they do not have the access to basic protections that we do. When two prisoners want to trade, they have to trust each other the way Orlando and Roland must trust each other, otherwise they won't make a trade.
For most prisons, in most places, this isn't a problem. They are small enough that reputations are sufficient for people to know who is and is not trustworthy. And when people do violate the rules, enforcement is done spontaneously. People take it upon themselves to keep others in line, which is one way to build up their own good reputations with the group. This jibes with how small groups of people deal with problems.
But in some places, specifically Texas and California, the prison population gets so large that reputation effects again fail. The guards have no wish to help by enforcing the informal rules that the prisoners use to resolve disputes. So, the prisoners need to come up with their own government.
And this government is the gang.
The gang, in essence, is a group of people small enough that its members can keep track of the others' reputations within the gang. This allows in-group transaction to occur with the old, small-town technology that works so well. If Orlando and Antony want to horse trade, they have all the information at their disposal. If Roland and Antoine want to horse trade, they have all of the information they need. This solves a lot of problems.
Bu the gang is also introduces a stable hierarchy. The way to rise in that hierarchy is to have a good reputation. This includes fair dealing within the group, but it also includes enforcement -- rather like the natural enforcement of the small group. And further tasks, related to intergang interactions.
But what happens when Orlando and Roland consider horse trading? They no longer have these protections, so the trade is less likely to happen. The gangs encourage their members to avoid members of the other gangs. It keeps things nicer that way...
This semi-government, this protection pact, is a natural way in which to handle difficulties that come from larger group sizes -- and not just for trading. So, rather than government appearing from whole cloth, it grows up bit by bit. First, by forming gangs. Then...
Well, then what? A little magic is still required.
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1 Let alone the true reason for licencing laws, which are probably anti-consumer more often than a guarantee of quality.
Based on my memory of The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System by David Skarbek (2014). Which I can't find right now.
This should also be compared to chapter 3 of Extreme Economies by Richard Davies, which provides a look at the Louisiana State Prison (Angola) for comparisons, as well as chapter 2 on the operation of refugee camps.
While looking for Social Order, I noticed that at some point I bought a book by Francis Fukuyama on this very topic. That'll be an interesting comparison.
Later on, I'll try to incorporate some insights from Against the Grain by James C. Scott, into this, too.
We usually look to government to make those guarantees for us. Licencing laws, small claims courts, etc., give Orlandos and Rolands some confidence that transactions are safe, or that they have reasonable redress if bilked. But, this is probably not how government grew.1
To look at this, let's see how people interact today when they don't have the full protection of the state. In America, at least, these people are prisoners. Technically, prisoners are guaranteed the rights everyone else has. Technically, prisoners have an immediate governmental authority to look after them. But, really, while incarcerated, they do not have the access to basic protections that we do. When two prisoners want to trade, they have to trust each other the way Orlando and Roland must trust each other, otherwise they won't make a trade.
For most prisons, in most places, this isn't a problem. They are small enough that reputations are sufficient for people to know who is and is not trustworthy. And when people do violate the rules, enforcement is done spontaneously. People take it upon themselves to keep others in line, which is one way to build up their own good reputations with the group. This jibes with how small groups of people deal with problems.
Find the "leaving them out on the ice" quote (Ronson?)
But in some places, specifically Texas and California, the prison population gets so large that reputation effects again fail. The guards have no wish to help by enforcing the informal rules that the prisoners use to resolve disputes. So, the prisoners need to come up with their own government.
And this government is the gang.
The gang, in essence, is a group of people small enough that its members can keep track of the others' reputations within the gang. This allows in-group transaction to occur with the old, small-town technology that works so well. If Orlando and Antony want to horse trade, they have all the information at their disposal. If Roland and Antoine want to horse trade, they have all of the information they need. This solves a lot of problems.
Bu the gang is also introduces a stable hierarchy. The way to rise in that hierarchy is to have a good reputation. This includes fair dealing within the group, but it also includes enforcement -- rather like the natural enforcement of the small group. And further tasks, related to intergang interactions.
But what happens when Orlando and Roland consider horse trading? They no longer have these protections, so the trade is less likely to happen. The gangs encourage their members to avoid members of the other gangs. It keeps things nicer that way...
This semi-government, this protection pact, is a natural way in which to handle difficulties that come from larger group sizes -- and not just for trading. So, rather than government appearing from whole cloth, it grows up bit by bit. First, by forming gangs. Then...
Well, then what? A little magic is still required.
-----
1 Let alone the true reason for licencing laws, which are probably anti-consumer more often than a guarantee of quality.
Based on my memory of The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System by David Skarbek (2014). Which I can't find right now.
This should also be compared to chapter 3 of Extreme Economies by Richard Davies, which provides a look at the Louisiana State Prison (Angola) for comparisons, as well as chapter 2 on the operation of refugee camps.
While looking for Social Order, I noticed that at some point I bought a book by Francis Fukuyama on this very topic. That'll be an interesting comparison.
Later on, I'll try to incorporate some insights from Against the Grain by James C. Scott, into this, too.
